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A B S T R A C T   
The V2V services have been specified by the 3GPP standards body to support road safety and non-safety ap-
plications in the 5G cellular networks. It is expected to use the direct link (known as the PC5 interface), as well as 
the new radio interface in 5G, to provide a connectivity platform among vehicles. Particularly, vehicles will use 
the PC5 interface to broadcast safety messages to inform each other about potential hazards on the road. In order 
to function safely, robust security mechanisms are needed to ensure the authenticity of received messages and 
trustworthiness of message senders. These mechanisms must neither add significantly to message latency nor 
affect the performance of safety applications. The existing 5G-V2V standard allow protection of V2V messages to 
be handled by higher layer security solutions defined by other standards in the ITS domain. However having a 
security solution at the 5G access layer is conceivably preferable in order to ensure system compatibility and 
reduce deployment cost. Accordingly, the main aim of this paper is to review options for 3GPP access layer 
security in future 5G-V2V releases. Initially, a summary of 5G-V2V communications and corresponding service 
requirements is presented. An overview of the application level security standards is also given, followed by a 
review of the impending options to secure V2V broadcast messages at the 5G access layer. Finally, paper presents 
the relevant open issues and challenges on providing 3GPP access layer security solution for direct V2V 
communication.   
1. Introduction 
Intelligent transportation system (ITS) is a label applied to a range of 
applications providing advanced services from plat-forms integrating 
network-connected (usually, road) vehicles and infrastructure. In this 
context, the communications between vehicles and between vehicles 
and other ITS nodes are usually categorized in terms of four modes; 
vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), vehicle-to-network (V2N), vehicle-to- 
infrastructure (V2I) and vehicle-to-pedestrian (V2P). Here, ‘infrastruc-
ture’ refers to road-side infrastructure and V2I supports communications 
between vehicles and a variety of services and functions of the ITS 
platforms and applications built upon it. Collectively, the modes are 
known as Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X). V2X communications can be 
used to improve road safety, enhance traffic efficiency and support 
advanced in-vehicle user infotainment services. Information received by 
a vehicle about other nearby vehicles, road conditions, traffic signals, 
etc., can be merged with the data from the vehicle’s on-board sensors to 
improve the driver’s situation awareness and automated/assisted deci-
sion making. In this context, V2X can be seen as a means of extending the 
range, volume and variety of sensor data avail-able to the driver. The 
organization of connectivity between ITS nodes (vehicles, road-side 
infrastructure and pedestrian) is based on the well-known OSI (Open 
System Interconnection) layered reference model, which is extended to 
form the ITS reference architecture [1], as illustrated in Fig. 1. The ar-
chitecture consists of four horizontal layers (communication stack) and 
two vertical functions spanning all layers. The application and facilities 
layer generate and format different kinds of safety and non-safety 
messages, and then hand them over to the net-work and transport 
layers for transportation from the source of a message to its destination. 
The access layer determines the radio-level communication technology 
to be used for over-the- air transmission. There are two main technical 
approaches to this:   
• Dedicated Short-Range Communication (DSRC) in the US, and ITS- 
G5 in the European Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems (C- 
ITS) initiative utilize a variant of WiFi technology based on the IEEE 
802.11p standard running in the 5.9 GHz frequency band; 
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• Cellular-V2X (C–V2X), which is defined by the 3GPP as part of its 
LTE and ongoing 5G families of standards. C– V2X includes two 
modes: longer-range, higher latency. communication via the cellular 
network known as C–V2N, and low latency, direct communication 
referred to as C– V2V/I/P. 
Referring to Fig. 1, the vertical functions, i.e. security and manage-
ment services are provided on a layer-by-layer basis to man-age the ITS 
(safety and non-safety) application requirements and secure the 
communication between the communicating nodes. Notably, this paper 
mainly focuses on the security aspect of C– V2V using 5G new radio (5G- 
NR) as the underlying radio technology. 
The 3GPP has, in Release 14 [2] and above, studied the requirements 
that derive from the wide range of V2X services. 
and then approved the support of V2X communication in the current 
LTE and upcoming 5G-NR technologies. Specifically, the 5G-NR will 
utilize the existing uplink and downlink to pro-vide V2N communication 
via the cellular network, and also provides for a direct device-to-device 
(D2D) link over an interface known as PC5 to enable direct V2V, V2I and 
V2P communications [3,4], as illustrated in Fig. 2. The 5G system’s 
sup-port for ultra-high data rate, low latency, comprehensive quality of 
service and extended coverage, provides natural benefits to vehicular 
communication. As such, 5G-NR along with proper enhancements can 
be considered as a unified and scalable solution for all V2X communi-
cations, which can be managed and controlled by means of widely 
deployed cellular network infrastructure. 
The direct PC5-based communication has lower latency than the 
uplink/downlink communication via cellular network infrastructure 
and was originally proposed to support device-to- device proximity 
services [5]. It is envisioned for the majority of V2V applications, 
particularly safety use-cases, which have challenging latency re-
quirements. In contrast, the Uu-based communication is expected to 
support safety applications that require long-range communication, 
non-safety V2N services like traffic efficiency, and user infotainment 
applications. These applications have no strict requirements on delay 
(up to 500 ms) and reliability, although quality degrades with increasing 
packet loss and longer communication range [6,7]. 
For short-range direct V2V communication, broadcast trans-mission 
is adopted as primary mode of communication between sending and 
receiving vehicles. This is because safety information from a given 
sending vehicle is expected to be known by all vehicles within the vi-
cinity of the sender, in order for them to be aware of the current road 
condition and take necessary action. For instance, a vehicle reports in-
formation about bad traffic conditions to its neighbors, so that they can 
take necessary action. Also, majority of the safety applications require to 
process mobility information (e.g. position, speed, direction) of vehicles 
within the vicinity of the target vehicle. Hence, the PC5 interface is 
utilised to support the direct exchange of broadcast messages between 
vehicles that are in close proximity to each other. Each vehicle 
(henceforth referred to as V-UE) broadcasts messages in a periodic or 
event-triggered manner, to support various V2V safety applications. The 
V2V safety applications have the most stringent performance re-
quirements for the communication layer, with some use-cases requiring 
ultra-reliable communication links and a maximum end-to-end latency 
of 100 ms or less [8,9]. 
V2V broadcast messages need to be protected against security 
threats, which include message forgery, replay, etc. Particularly the 
spread of malicious information in vehicular network environments 
could have disastrous consequences, including loss of life and property. 
Thus, the fundamental security requirements in V2V broadcast systems 
are firstly to authenticate the source of a received broadcast message, 
secondly to verify that the message has not been tampered with while it 
was in transit, and thirdly, to guarantee that the source of a broadcast 
message can be held accountable for its actions in the event of an 
investigation. Although these are quite standard requirements for mes-
sage security in wireless networks, for which well-known solutions exist, 
Fig. 1. V2X communication stack.  
Fig. 2. 5G-V2X communication modes.  
M. Muhammad and G.A. Safdar                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Array 11 (2021) 100084
3
the V2V/P/I use cases have particular characteristics that constrain so-
lutions: (1) high mobility of vehicles with short connection time (2) 
vehicles need to verify and process received broadcast messages rapidly 
(3) heterogeneous environment with varying density of vehicles and (4) 
one-way transmission mode with no prior security association. Pres-
ently, there are two approaches for application layer security in ITS, 
namely: the IEEE 1609.2 standard [10] and the European Telecommu-
nication Standard Institute (ETSI) standard [11]. Both solutions rely on 
the same principles of asymmetric cryptosystems and vehicular public 
key infrastructure (VPKI). In both approaches, each vehicle owns a 
private key, and the corresponding public key is made widely available. 
Together they are used to secure V2V communication by digitally 
signing and verifying every safety message. The link be-tween the key 
pair and the identity of its owner is provided by a certificate signed by a 
certificate authority (CA). However, the benefits of this approach are 
accompanied by some challenging problems. Research studies have 
confirmed through simulations [12–14], as well as practical tests on real 
equipment [15] and modelling [16] that the signature verification 
overhead of VPKI-based schemes leads to excessive latency or packet 
loss when road traffic is dense. This therefore raises concern about the 
performance and scalability of these security solutions particularly in 
high traffic density regions, where vehicles need to verify large number 
of received messages within a very short period of time [17]. Currently, 
there are limited research findings on the experimental deployment and 
performance evaluation of these security solutions under realistic traffic 
conditions for safety-critical applications. Moreover, a VPKI-based so-
lution requires the deployment of trusted services for certificate man-
agement, which increases system complexity. Despite the shortcomings 
of these standard solutions, these solutions are applied at the application 
layer level of the ITS reference architecture. Although 3GPP currently 
allow V2V security to be handled at the upper layers of the ITS 
communication stack, while focusing on improving the radio access 
layer for V2V communication, having a 
security solution at the 3GPP access layer may be preferable in order 
to ensure system compatibility and reduce deployment cost. 
This paper focuses on the analysis of ways to provide fast and effi-
cient security solutions at the 3GPP radio access layer of 5G-NR systems. 
In contrast to previous works, such as [18–21] and [22], this article 
specifically addresses security issues within the context of 5G-based V2V 
services. The works of [23] investigates the security aspects of 3GPP 
networks for V2X communications, but focuses on privacy issues of 
vehicle owners, as well as analyses the security concern when virtuali-
zation and software defined networking are used for V2V. Table 1 pro-
vides list of abbreviations employed in this paper. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a 
range of V2V safety applications and their corresponding requirements 
targeted at the communications network. In Section 3, a background on 
security aspects as well as security requirements of V2V broadcast 
communication is presented. The application layer security standards 
for V2V communication are described in Section 4. Section 5 focuses to- 
wards the main aim of this review paper and presents access layer se-
curity solutions that employed different cryptographic methods to 
secure 5G-V2V communication, followed by a comparative and critical 
analysis of the applied security methods. Further challenges and open 
research issues are described in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 draws a 
concluding remarks. 
2. V2V applications and use-cases 
The 3GPP has identified a number of basic safety and non-safety V2V 
use-cases relevant to ITS. The communication requirements for these 
use-cases are shown in Table 2. Also in Release 15 [24], emerging 5G-NR 
(New Radio) access technology is introduced to support advanced V2X 
applications that will provide semi-automated and fully automated 
driving functionalities in addition to the basic safety services. For this, 
the 3GPP has proposed new enhanced V2V (eV2V) applications and the 
organization have started work on enhancement of 3GPP support for 
these new 5G eV2V services in Release 16 [25]. The 5G eV2V applica-
tions and use-cases require extremely high data rates, very rigorous 
reliability, extended communication range and extremely low latency 
transmissions as included in Table 2. 
Despite the wide variety of V2V applications and use-cases, there are 
only two message types defined to convey the applica-tion’s informa-
tion; cooperative awareness messages (CAMs) [26] and decentralized 
environmental notification messages (DENM) [27]. CAMs are periodic 
messages exchanged between vehicles to inform each other about the 
current mobility information for safety purposes. Typical information 
contained in a CAM mes-sage includes time stamp, vehicle’s position, 
speed, location, heading and other trajectory features provided by 
measuring in-struments (e.g. speed sensor, GPS, etc.). In contrast, 
DENMs are safety messages generated upon detecting an event or road 
hazard and transmitted to warn road users in advance about. 
this event in a defined geographic area. The data contained in DENM 
messages are event management information, generation time, validity 
period, etc., and of course information about the event itself. The most 
important difference between CAM and DENM is that DENMs are 
broadcast to vehicles within the event area, and can be extended further 
by re-broadcasting the message in a multi-hop transmission, while, a 
CAM is broad- 
cast to all vehicles within the broadcast range, in a single-hop 
transmission. 
As incorrect messages can have safety consequences, security is 
imperative for V2V services. The main V2V security features are source 
authentication, message integrity and non-repudiation [28–30]. 
Table 1 
List of abbreviations.  
Abbreviation Extended form 
3GPP 3rd Generation Partnership Project 
5G-NR 5G New Radio 
AA Authorisation authority 
AC Authentication Centre 
CA Certification Authority 
CAMs Cooperative Awareness Messages 
C-ITS Cooperative ITS 
CRL Certificate Revocation List 
C–V2X Cellular V2X 
D2D Device-to-Device 
DENMs Decentralized Environmental Notification Messages 
DoS Denial of Service 
DSRC Dedicated Short Range Communication 
EA Enrolment Authority 
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm 
ETSI European Telecommunication Standard In-stitute 
eV2V Enhanced V2V 
DoS Denial of Service 
FastAuth Fast Authentication 
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code 
ITS Intelligent Transportation Systems 
OSI Open System Interconnection 
MAC Message Authentication Code 
MHT Merkle Hash Tree 
RCA Root Certification Authority 
RSU Road Side Unit Fast Authentication 
SelAuth Selective Authentication 
TA Trusted Authority 
TESLA Time Efficient Stream loss-tolerant Au-thentication 
TEAM Trust Extended Authentication Mechanism 
URLLC Ultra Reliable Low Latency Communications 
V-UE Vehicle User 





VANETs Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks 
VPKI Vehicular Public Key Infrastructure  
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Depending on the event type, confi-dentiality may also be required for 
DENM messages and there-fore the message will additionally need to be 
encrypted over the air interface. However, the security mechanisms 
must not pre-vent CAM and DENM safety messages being exchanged and 
processed by legitimate V-UEs within the performance require-ments of 
the underlying safety applications. The next sections discusses in detail 
the security aspect of V2V communication. 
3. Broadcast security for V2V communications 
The broadcast nature of the radio medium means that wire-less 
communications are prone to several forms of attack. In the case of 
V2V, information from the outside world or un-known vehicles sent over 
potentially insecure channels directly influences the behaviour of one’s 
vehicle. Consequently, security is considered as an essential part for the 
wide acceptability of V2V communications. The unique characteristics, 
constraints and configurations of V2V communication mean that the 
deployment of a robust security solution is practically hard. This section 
presents potential security threats that can disrupt a V2V system, and the 
main security requirements needed to protect V2V communications. 
3.1. Threat model 
Direct V2V communication belongs to the family of wire-less ad hoc 
networks. Forms of attack that exist in standard wireless networks (e.g. 
identity impersonation, DoS, and re-play) also affect V2V communica-
tion. In addition, V2V communication possess additional vulnerabilities 
due to its unique characteristics, sensitivity of the messages being 
exchanged and the nature of V2V applications. Below is a brief 
description of major classes of threats related to V2V:   
• Bogus Messages: Here a V-UE broadcasts false messages to affect the 
behaviour of other V-UEs. For instance, a malicious V-UE could 
report false information about bad traffic conditions to its neighbors, 
forcing them to take alternate path, while the malicious V-UE frees 
the path for itself. Also, a malicious V-UE may broadcast harmful 
messages in order to mislead receiving vehicles regarding the current 
road condition and cause them to take a wrong decision or action.  
• Identity Impersonation: Typically, in V2V scenarios, the receiver 
does not care about the actual identity of sender, but to filter-out 
bogus messages, will want to know that the sender is trustworthy/ 
authorised to send such messages. To counter this, a malicious V-UE 
may assume the identity of one or more legitimate V-UE in order to 
broad-cast erroneous messages. Similar messages received appar-
ently from multiple senders could make the information contained in 
the messages more credible. A malicious V-UE may also want to 
insert a misleading message into a stream emitted by a legitimate V- 
UE in order to make receivers think e.g. that the apparent sender had 
changed speed or direction.  
• Replay Messages: It may be difficult for a malicious V- UE to 
construct a convincing message appearing to come from a legitimate 
sender. In a replay attack, a malicious V-UE records a message that 
was transmitted by a legitimate V-UE and later re-broadcasts it one 
Table 2 
5G V2X applications, use-cases and corresponding communication re-
quirements. Source [31].  
• Message Modification: A malicious V-UE could alter the messages being 
broadcast, especially when it is acting as a relay. For instance in multi-hop 
transmission, a malicious V-UE acting as a relay node may receive messages 
from one party, change their content, and rebroadcast them to other V-UEs.  
• Denial of Service (DoS) attack: The main objective of this attack is to prevent 
legitimate users from using the network services by tying up finite resources. 
An example of a DoS attack in the context of V2V, is the situation whereby a 
V-UE receives a large number of fake or genuine signed messages and is 
unable to verify them all in time to react. Similarly, the receiver’s input 
message buffer could overflow causing messages to be dropped. Such so- 
called computation-based DoS can easily occur among vehicles in high 
traffic density regions even with-out any malicious intention.  
• Repudiation: A malicious V-UE may deny that it sent (or did not send) a 
given message, or may claim falsely that another V-UE sent (or did not send) 
a given message in order to mislead an investigation. For example, a mali-
cious V-UE sends an emergency vehicle warnings, so it can bypass other V- 









V2V CAM • Message payload 50-300 
Bytes 
• Maximum latency 100 ms 
• Transmission rate 10 
messages/s 
Control Loss Warning V2V DENM • Message payload 50-300 
Bytes 
• Maximum latency 100 ms 




V2V CAM • Message payload 400 Bytes 
• Maximum latency 100 ms 




V2V DENM • Message payload 50-300 
Bytes 
• Maximum latency 20 ms 
• Transmission rate 50 
messages/s 
Queue Warning V2V/V2I DENM • Message payload 400 Bytes 
• Maximum latency 100 ms 
• Transmission rate 10 
messages/s 
Curve Speed Warning V2I Unclear • Message payload 50-400 
Bytes 
• Maximum latency 1s 
• Transmission rate 1 
message/s 
Warning to Pedestrian V2P CAM • Message payload 50-300 
Bytes 
• Maximum latency 100 ms 
• Transmission rate 10 
messages/s 
Vehicles Platooning V2V/V2I CAM • Message payload 50-6500 
Bytes 
• Communication range up to 
350 m 
• Maximum latency 25 ms 
• Transmission rate 40 
messages/s 
Advanced Driving V2V/V2I CAM • Message payload 300-6500 
Bytes 
• Communication range up to 
700 m 
• Maximum latency 100 ms 
• Transmission rate 10 
messages/s 
Extended Sensors V2V CAM • Message payload 1600 Bytes 
• Communication range up to 
1 km 
• Maximum latency 100 ms  







• Transmission rate 10 
messages/s 
Remote Driving V2V/V2I CAM • Maximum latency 5 ms 
• Transmission rate 200 
messages/s 
Autonomous Driving V2V/V2I CAM • As low as 1 ms delay 
• Transmission rate 1000 
messages/s  
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or more times. Although the message content was genuine at the 
original time of transmission, it could be misleading if received at a 
later time or multiple times. 
3.2. V2V security requirements 
In the absence of a solid security scheme, the potential threats 
described above can compromise V2V communication. Due to the 
cooperative nature of V2V safety applications, these attacks could cause 
serious harm to road users and may possibly lead to loss of lives and 
property. In order to protect V2V safety applications, the 3GPP working 
group on security [32] has identified V2V security requirements that 
need to be fulfilled, as follows:  
• Authorization: V-UEs shall be authorized to participate in V2V 
communication  
• Source Authentication: V-UEs should be able to authenticate and 
verify that the sender of the received broadcast messages has a valid 
identity  
• Message Integrity: The integrity of the received broad-cast messages 
shall be checked to ensure that the content has not been modified by 
any party while in transit  
• Replay Protection: Freshness of V2V broadcast messages shall be 
ensured so that receiving vehicles accepts only freshly generated 
messages, thus preventing replay at-tacks  
• Non-repudiation: Ensures that once a V-UE broadcasts a message, it 
cannot deny that action later in the event that some incorrect 
behaviour is detected. This property allows a receiving vehicle to 
prove to a third party who is accountable for generating the broad-
cast message. 
Although 3GPP has specified the above security requirements to 
protect V2V applications across the PC5 interface, there is no normative 
solution mandated. Rather, it is left as an application issue, to be 
handled by higher layer security solutions defined by other standards in 
the ITS domain. This is because the 3GPP focus is currently more on 
enhancing the functionality of the radio access layer e.g. radio resource 
al-location and management among vehicles [33,34], improving 5G 
physical layer structure [35,36], channel synchronization issues [37], 
among other things. The next section describes application layer-based 
security solution and its shortcomings when applied in the context of 
cellular V2V communication. 
4. Application layer security standards for V2V communication 
The IEEE 1609.2 and ETSI TS 102–940 are the standards defined by 
IEEE and ETSI respectively describing security services for V2V 
communication at the application layer of the ITS reference architec-
ture. These solutions have similar working principles and protect mes-
sages using the same security procedures, with minor difference in terms 
of the number of functional entities and structure. They are both based 
on the concept of public key cryptography and the use of VPKI to pro-
vision and manage security credentials of the vehicles. In a public key 
cryptosystem, each party has a pair of keys, one that must be kept secret, 
and the other that is made public. If an agent uses its private key to sign a 
message, a receiver can use the sender’s public key to verify the signa-
ture. If the sender’s private key has not been disclosed, the receiver can 
be sure that the message was sent by the owner of the key pair and has 
not been modified in transit. Often, a third party known as Certificate 
Authority (CA) will issue a credential known as a certificate, which as-
sociates a public key with an identity. The CA signs the certificate with 
its own private key so that its integrity can be verified by anyone in 
possession of the CA’s own certificate. If the CA is trusted directly, or can 
derive its authority from a directly-trusted higher CA via a chain of 
certificates, then a receiver in possession of the sender’s certificate, will 
additionally know the identity of the sender. Similarly, the sender can 
encrypt a message using its intended recipient’s public key and be sure 
that only the intended recipient can decrypt and read it. Aside from 
issuing certificates, the CA is also responsible for certificate renewal 
when the validity of a node’s certificate expires, and certificate revo-
cation when a node is compromised or exhibits malicious behaviour. In 
such situations, the CA in-validates the certificate, adding it to a cer-
tificate revocation list (CRL) that is made available to all participating 
nodes. All receivers check the CRL for each received message prior to 
verification. Messages that are signed using revoked certificates are 
discarded. 
For illustration, Fig. 3 depicts the high level architecture of the ETSI 
security standard. A root certificate authority (RCA), has the highest 
level of trust in the PKI hierarchy, and delivers a certificate each to the 
enrolment authority (EA) and the authorization authority (AA) to 
authorize them to issue certificates to V-UEs. The EA issues a long-term 
certificate to a V-UE during registration, which is considered as a proof 
of identity, and used to identify and authenticate the vehicle within the 
PKI. In contrast, the AA issues short-term certificates to V-UEs, which are 
used to protect the V2V communication. Every broadcast packet con-
tains the signed message together with the sender’s short term certifi-
cate. Then the receiving vehicle first verifies the sender’s certificate and 
then the signature of the received broadcast message. In this way, a 
receiving vehicle can ensure the trustworthiness of the sender and the 
integrity of the received message without a prior security relationship 
with the sending vehicle. The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm 
(ECDSA) is used in both security solutions because it is fast and efficient 
compared to other digital signature algorithms such as RSA. A typical 
packet broadcast by (V − UE)S to n receivers, (V − UE)Rn, has the 
following format:  
(V − UE)S → (V − UE)Rn = {M, σS Ks [M|T], Certs}                                
where M is the message, σ S Ks [M T] indicates digital signature of (V UE)S 
using its private key over the concatenation of message M and a time-
stamp T for freshness checking to pre-vent a replay attack. In addition, 
each packet contains the sending vehicle’s digital certificate denoted by 
Certs, which contain information as shown below:  
Certs = PuKs|IDS |σS KCA |IDCA|VPtime                                                      
where PuKS is the sending vehicle’s public key bound to its identity IDS, 
σS KCA and IDCA are the authorisation authority’s signature and unique 
identifier respectively, and VPtime is the validity time of the certificate. 
Since each packet includes a digital certificate, any vehicle receiving the 
packet could con-firm its authenticity by checking that the sender’s 
certificate is signed by a trusted authority, and then verifying the 
sender’s digital signature on the received broadcast packet. 
This security approach defined at the application layer satisfies all 
the fundamental V2V security requirements-source authentication, 
integrity of data and non-repudiation, and can thus be applied to protect 
V2V communications. However, the performance of these solutions 
comes with some practical concerns. Firstly, in the IEEE 1609.2 stan-
dard, a CRL is periodically distributed to all connected vehicles in order 
to check and remove malicious/misbehaving vehicles from the 
network. This process requires connectivity to disseminate the list 
and generates high signalling traffic across the network. Moreover, the 
CRL checking process itself increases the verification time of received 
broadcast messages. An alternative approach adopted in ETSI TS stan-
dard involves issuing of short term certificates in bulk to a given vehicle. 
However, renewal of short-term certificates on-demand also requires 
always-on and reliable connection. In addition, the certificate reloading 
process incurs de-lay of up to 500 ms as investigated in Ref. [38]. Such 
delay could affect the performance of the underlying V2V safety 
application. 
Secondly, digital signature generation and verification is required for 
each broadcast message, with verification being performed indepen-
dently by each recipient. These operations, verification in particular, 
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incur high computational overhead, which introduces delay that may 
breach the latency constraint of some V2V safety applications. Accord-
ing to the results obtained from the implementation of IEEE 1609.2 
standard in the works of [39,40], one ECDSA signature generation and 
verification process can take up to 4 ms and 20 ms per operation, 
respectively. Consequently, hardware support is required for these 
cryptographic operations. Furthermore, the size of each signed message 
is 67 bytes accompanied by certificate of 125 bytes [41]. This means that 
a message length will be increased by the security overhead associated 
with signature and certificate sizes. When there are hundreds of vehicles 
broadcasting safety messages within a communication range, a large 
number of messages needs to be verified within a very short time 
inter-val by each receiving vehicle, and this becomes a bottleneck. To 
demonstrate a typical constraint of VPKI-based solutions in a densely 
populated environment, consider a scenario where 200 vehicles are 
broadcasting safety messages between each other. With a beaconing 
rates of 1–10Hz, each vehicle needs to generate between 1 and 10 sig-
natures per second and needs to verify between 400 and 4000 signatures 
per second. In such a scenario, many safety messages will get lost or 
verified out of order, since the time required to verify the signature on 
the received messages will introduce high delay that may exceed the 
maximum delay for most V2V safety applications. Hence, the expensive 
nature of digital signature verification operations could make vehicles 
vulnerable to computation-based DoS at-tacks without any malicious 
intent. 
Finally, the VPKI-based solution requires a large scale infrastructure 
for provisioning and revocation of certificates for vehicles and other ITS 
entities. Such infrastructure is expensive and time-consuming to build, 
and subject to political and administrative delays. It is not yet clear 
whether governmental transportation authorities or vehicle manufac-
turers should be responsible for its establishment and operation. It is 
evident that PKC-based solutions at the application layer, while satis-
fying all the required security properties, incur a significant overhead 
that may impact the critical latency of V2V messages, especially in a 
dense urban environment. Consequently, there is need to explore other 
cryptographic methods to build security schemes at the 3GPP access 
layer. 
The following section thoroughly looks into the access layer security 
solutions which employed different cryptographic methods to secure 
V2V communication. 
5. 3GPP access layer security for V2V broadcast communication 
Having reviewed the standard approach to V2V broadcast message 
security, namely using public key cryptography at the application layer, 
this section examines candidate approaches to providing robust security 
features at the 3GPP access layer. 
5.1. Symmetric cryptography-based solution 
3GPP network security is primarily based on symmetric key cryp-
tography, and considerable support for it is already built into the current 
architecture and standards [42]. Consequently, it makes sense first to 
consider whether it can also be applied to address the security re-
quirements of direct V2V messages broadcast over the PC5 interface. 
Symmetric key cryptography makes used of the same key, known as 
secret key, for ciphering and deciphering. Compared to public key 
(asymmetric) cryptography, symmetric cryptography is faster and em-
ploys simpler algorithms as basic building blocks (e.g. Message 
Authentication Code (MAC), hash function) that have linear computa-
tional complexity, and so can ensure authenticity of the message source 
and integrity of the received message with low computational and 
communication overhead. However, there are also disadvantages. 
Whereas in asymmetric cryptography, a total of N key pairs is needed to 
enable secure communication within a community of N nodes, in sym-
metric cryptography, N*(N-1)/2 secret keys would be required. 
Furthermore, each pair of nodes needs to agree a key to use without 
disclosing it others as illustrated in Fig. 4. Thus, key management and 
Fig. 3. ETSI security architecture.  
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distribution is a significant headache. 
Using distinct keys for each node pair also makes broad-cast 
communication impossible. A single symmetric key can be used to 
support communication within a trusted group of nodes, but the larger 
the group, the more likely it is for the key to be leaked accidently or for 
one of the nodes to be unworthy of trust; in either case, all communi-
cation within the group is compromised. Non-repudiation also becomes 
problematic; responsibility for sending a message can only be narrowed 
down to the membership of the group sharing the key used to create the 
MAC. Consequently, symmetric-based schemes are often used together 
with asymmetric ones to overcome above short-comings. A common 
approach is to use the relatively expensive asymmetric cryptography to 
establish a secure channel be-tween two mutually-authenticating nodes. 
A shared secret key is then agreed via this channel, and used with a 
symmetric scheme to protect the bulk of the communication. In vehic-
ular networks, several research works investigate the use of symmetric 
cryptographic methods to provide V2V security. For instance, a novel 
authentication framework for LTE-V2V and V2I communications was 
proposed in Ref. [43]. It combines sym-metric and public cryptography 
for mutual authentication be-tween buses and bus stations. Performance 
evaluation shows. 
that their scheme has a reduced authentication time compared to 
pure asymmetric schemes. In Ref. [44], the authors proposed a broad-
cast message authentication scheme based on MACs with symmetric 
encryption. Although this approach attempts to minimize the compu-
tational overhead of asymmetric operations, other problems are intro-
duced, such as the need for efficient mechanisms for secret key 
distribution between the connected vehicles. Also [45], proposed a 
symmetric-based authentication scheme for vehicular networks. This 
scheme uses a MAC algorithm with a hash chain element as keys to 
generate MAC tags. The scheme achieves lower message verification 
delay when compared to public key based schemes, but does not support 
the non-repudiation property. Furthermore [46], designed an RSU-aided 
message authentication scheme. The authors used MAC algorithm and a 
secret key that is shared between a sending vehicle and the RSU. 
Whenever a sending vehicle broad-casts a safety message, RSU verifies it 
first and then notifies all vehicles within its transmission range of the 
results. In another approach [47], proposed two broadcast authentica-
tion schemes based on elliptic curve encryption to overcome the 
excessive signature verification process. While their FastAuth (fast 
authentication) scheme secures periodic single-hop beacon messages, 
the SelAuth (selective authentication) secures multi-hop applications in 
which a bogus signature may spread out quickly and impact a significant 
number of vehicles. SelAuth provides fast isolation of malicious senders, 
even under a dynamic topology at low computational costs. 
Similarly, the authors of [48] designed a lightweight and 
de-centralized authentication scheme called TEAM (trust-extended 
authentication mechanism). This scheme employs a pre-shared- key, 
XOR operation and hash function during the authentication process. The 
scheme was implemented based on the transitive trust relationships 
between vehicles, and hence provides a de-centralized authentication 
scheme. In Ref. [49], an authentication scheme that uses one-way hash 
functions and secret keys be-tween vehicle and RSU was proposed. Also 
[50], proposed a novel authentication scheme which focuses on sender 
authenti-cation. The scheme makes use of hash chains and 
authentica-tion codes signed by an authentication center (AC) to 
authenti-cate vehicles. Each broadcast packet contains the safety 
mes-sage along with an authentication code. The receiving vehicle de-
crypts the code using the pre-loaded public key of an AC, so authenti-
cating the sender and the received message. An RSU- aided message 
authentication scheme, called RAISE, proposed in Ref. [51] uses a 
symmetric-based approach. In this scheme, vehicle established a shared 
secret key with RSU within its vicinity. The RSU are responsible for 
verifying messages, and then disseminate the verified messages to the 
vehicles. The scheme also takes the k-anonymity [52] technique to 
prevent a malicious node from associating a message with a particular 
vehicle to protect its privacy. However, this scheme is highly dependent 
on RSUs, which could not be available in all environments. The works of 
[46] extended the RAISE scheme to include a method for vehicles to 
cooperatively authenticate messages in locations where RSUs are not 
available. 
5.2. Asymmetric-based solutions 
Asymmetric cryptosystems can also be used to provide security 
within the 3GPP access layer. The concept of asymmetric cryptography 
as applied at the application layer has already been covered in the 
previous section. The approach would be fundamentally similar here, 
and would face the same challenges in high traffic density scenarios. It 
would also require introducing VPKI to 3GPP just to serve the purposes 
of direct communication via the PC5 interface. The following are 
research works that uses different approaches to minimize the compu-
tational complexity of asymmetric cryptosystems. 
In [53], the authors used a computationally efficient two-way 
anonymous authentication scheme based on the anony-mous certifi-
cates and signatures to verify the message source and integrity in V2V. 
Furthermore [54], proposed an enhanced dual authentication and key 
management scheme for VANETs using the elliptic curve cryptography 
(ECC) and the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. The works of [55] 
proposed a two-way authentication scheme in which an anonymous 
identity was generated by a vehicle and verified by the trust authority to 
reduce the pressure on key management. Also [56], addresses the delay 
involved in validating certificate’s status. Instead of performing the time 
consuming CRLs check, the authors use a keyed Hash Message 
Authentication Code (HMAC), wherein 
the key used to calculate the HMAC is shared only between non- 
revoked vehicles. However, vehicles must still verify the validity of 
certificate and signature because it still uses a trusted authority (TA) for 
generating and distributing secret keys and certificates to all vehicles. 
Certificate revocation is triggered by the TA which involves revoking the 
current secret key and se curely distributing a new secret key to all non- 
revoked vehicles. Similarly, the secure privacy-preserving protocol 
Fig. 4. V2V Secure Message Transmission using Symmetric cryptography-based solution.  
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described in Ref. [45] aims to reduce the computational overhead 
related to dig-ital signature generation and verification of 
asymmetric-based approach. The authors uses a short message authen-
tication code tag that is appended to each outgoing message in place of a 
digi tal signature. Furthermore [57], proposes a conditional 
privacy-preserving authentication protocol based on self-certified public 
key encryption [58]. The authors aimed to reduce the overhead involved 
in generation and distribution of pseudonyms and the related certifi-
cates. However, the scheme requires the installation of a tamper-proof 
device in each vehicle. 
The anonymous authentication protocol proposed in Ref. [59] uses a 
trusted authority to assign each vehicle and RSU a long term certificate 
during registration. Each RSU is responsible for assigning a master key to 
each vehicle within its region after authenticating the vehicle based on 
its long term certificate. The vehicles then uses the master key to 
generate pseudonyms locally and uses them to sign messages to be 
transmitted. This work has lower signature verification overhead 
compared to a similar approach described in Ref. [60]. Also, the authors 
of [61] proposes an efficient method of the distribution of CRLs to ve 
hicles. They use a probabilistic data structure called Bloom fil ters [62] 
for checking the status of vehicles certificates. Bloom filter is known for 
low computation complexity since it uses k hash functions to store ele-
ments in the filter. This reduces the overhead cost considerably as 
compared to the conventional CRL checking process, which in turn 
lowers the message verification time. The use of Bloom filters is also 
more efficient and cost effective than the RSU-based distribution scheme 
because it does not require widespread deployment of RSUs. 
5.3. Group-based solutions 
The cooperative nature of V2V applications can be exploited to 
provide faster message verification processes for asymmetric-based 
schemes. Group-based solutions are a subset of asymmetric cryptosys-
tems in which vehicles that are close to each other cooperatively form a 
group to verify signatures of re ceived messages and share the results 
with one another. This is possible because vehicles within a given 
communication range practically receive the same warning message 
regarding a given event. As a result, group-based solutions reduce the 
time required for message verification and so help to meet the latency 
constraints of V2V applications. The works of [63–67] have combined 
asymmetric cryptography with group signat ture verification techniques 
in order to reduce the time spent for single message verification at the 
receiving vehicles. Similarly [46], proposed a cooperative 
message-authentication scheme. In this scheme, vehicles work together 
to verify only defined sets of received message signatures according to a 
selection algo rithm, and then share their results to each other. As ve-
hicles do not verify every single received message, which the compu-
tational overhead is reduced as compared to single message verification 
schemes. 
Furthermore, the works of [68,69] designed a scheme which 
employed cooperative message authentication techniques along with 
batch group signature verification and hash MAC (HMAC). The works of 
[70,71] presented a message authentication protocol for vehicular net-
works that employs a cooperative message authentication scheme and a 
short group signature technique. In this scheme, some vehicles act as 
signature verifiers for received messages, whereas other vehicles within 
the vicinity only receive verified messages from verifier vehicles. A DoS 
resilient cooperative message verification scheme for V2V communica-
tion was proposed in Ref. [72]. In this work, the authors’ leverages 
cooperating vehicles to verify signatures of received messages and then 
share the verification results with their neighbors. This significantly 
reduces the computation overhead of verifying each received message 
by a vehicles, and decreases waiting time of messages in queue before 
verification. The study in Ref. [73] present a cluster-based algorithm for 
se-curing emergency messages in V2V. In their scheme, vehicles form 
clusters and the cluster-heads are responsible for intra-cluster 
management. The authors also used MAC layer broad-cast protocols for 
increasing the reliability of emergency message dissemination [74]. 
proposed an on-the-fly group creation approach in which nearby RSUs 
create and maintain groups of vehicles. This allows vehicles to join the 
group maintained by RSU in its range, and also anonymously broadcast 
authenticated messages to vehicles within its group. However, authen-
ticated message dissemination among vehicles that belongs to different 
groups is not addressed. They also assumed that RSUs are densely 
deployed and trustworthy. The study in Ref. [75] uses group signatures 
and threshold authentication approach. In this scheme, a received 
message is accepted by a vehicle only after it has been authenticated by a 
threshold number of other vehicles to reduce the overhead related to 
downloading and checking CRL. It uses bilinear pairing based cryptog-
raphy. Since RSUs serve as group managers, if RSUs are compromised, 
the group keys could be at risk of been compromised. 
Group and cooperative-based schemes significantly reduce message 
verification delay. However, the drawback of group-based signature 
verification schemes is that it is difficult to form groups of vehicles due 
to the high relative speed and short connection time between moving 
vehicles. For instance in high-way scenarios, proximity-based group of 
vehicles may have an irregular distribution, with members joining and 
leaving constantly, which makes determining group boundaries a bottle- 
neck. Also, there is a need to establish a trust relationship be-tween those 
vehicles selected to verify the messages and those receiving the results. 
All of these contribute to signalling cost, which may lead to excessive 
delay. 
5.4. Hash chain-based solutions 
Hash chain techniques leverage lightweight cryptographic primitives 
(e.g. MACs) to build security solutions appropriate to a wireless envi-
ronment. One commonly used protocol for broadcast authentication in 
wireless ad hoc networks is called. 
TESLA (time efficient stream loss-tolerant authentication) [70,76]. 
TESLA uses a symmetric MAC algorithm to protect the integrity of 
messages, but introduces the element of asymmetry by delaying the 
disclosure of the secret key used. A given key may only be used by a 
sender to generate MACs within a well-defined time window, after 
which it is made public and may be used by receivers to verify the 
integrity of messages sent within that window. A new key is then used 
for the next window as illustrated in Fig. 5. A sequence of keys used by a 
given sender is generated such that the Nth key used is the result of 
applying a hash function to the N+1th key. Thus the hash function can 
be used to verify a sequence of keys used by a given sender, and hence 
the sequence of messages it sent, provided that the first key in the 
sequence can reliably be attributed to that sender. TESLA requires that 
communicating nodes synchronize their clocks in advance, and also 
agree how time is divided into fixed-length windows. 
The essential components of TESLA are; one-way key generation, 
computation of secret key delay disclosure interval, loose time syn-
chronization and a security condition check. Fig. 6 gives the description 
of the operations of TESLA protocol at both sender and receiver ends. At 
the sender end, the steps are: secret key pre-computation using hash 
chain, commitment key distribution and message broadcasting. Storing 
verified chain commitment key, validation of secret key after every 
disclosure and message verification are the steps involved at the receiver 
Fig. 5. TESLA’s key sequence.  
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end. 
The main benefits of TESLA are low computation over-head, low 
communication overhead, and robustness to packet loss. However, 
TESLA also has some shortcomings: the basic version cannot provide 
non-repudiation without a trusted time-stamping mechanism; there is a 
need for something like a conventional PKI to enable the identity of the 
sender’s commitment key chain to be verified; the one-way key chain 
has a finite length, so new chains need to be created periodically; 
delayed message verification of at least one time window; and there is a 
requirement for loose synchronization between sender and receivers. To 
overcome these shortcomings and to make TESLA adaptable to various 
environment and network configurations, new versions of TESLA have 
been proposed, including: immediate authentication TESLA, multiple 
TESLA, multi-level. 
TESLA, TESLA++, and μTESLA. These modify the original. TESLA’s 
operation with respect to reducing message verification delay, varying 
the key disclosure delay interval, efficient distribution of chain 
commitment key and applying an appropri ate message verification 
mechanism. For instance, TESLA++ is designed for vehicular networks 
[77], and μTESLA was pro-posed for energy-constrained IoT networks 
[78]. The following paragraph discusses research works that apply the 
original TESLA and its new variants to create security schemes for 
broadcast V2V communication. 
The works of bib79[47,79,80] addresses the delayed message veri-
fication of TESLA using a prediction-based approach in or-der to make it 
effective in V2V. They exploit the ability of a sending vehicle to predict 
its own future position by observing its movement pattern between two 
consecutive positions. The sender constructs a Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) 
to generate a prediction outcome. This is sent to the receiver in advance 
to enable instant message verification. Performance evaluation shows 
that as vehicles future positions are correctly predicted and verified, a 
considerable number of messages can be verified immediately even in 
congested environment. How-ever, this depends on the accuracy and 
computational cost of the chosen prediction algorithms. Similarly [81], 
designed a broadcast message authentication protocol based on TESLA 
for V2I networks. This scheme focuses on providing efficient message 
authentication when vehicles communicate with road-side sensors. In 
Ref. [82], the authors propose a hybrid authentication mechanism that 
combines ECDSA with TESLA++. In this scheme, a sender generates 
both MACs and ECDSA sig-natures for each message to be broadcast. A 
receiver authenticates each received broadcast message using the 
TESLA++ verification process and ignores ECDSA signature verification 
unless either the non-repudiation property is required, or the TESLA++
verification fails due to loss of the MAC packet or message/key packet. 
Simulation results indicate that packets are mostly authenticated using 
TESLA++ in less dense traffic conditions. However, in high traffic 
density situations when the channel contention increases, more packets 
are dropped before being received and the ECDSA signature verification 
process is used to authenticate messages. 
The works of [83, 84] proposed different approaches to distributing 
TESLA’s chain commitment key in dynamic V2V environment. In [83], 
the authors proposed a reactive approach; if a vehicle VA receives a 
message from another vehicle VB, but does not have its commitment key 
then it sends a key re-quest message to VB. A Bloom filter obtained from 
a RSU is used in validating VB’s response. The authors of [84] adopts a 
reactive commitment key exchange method. On receiving a message 
from an unknown vehicle, the receiver broadcasts its own commitment 
key along with a list of vehicles (including the sender) whose commit-
ment keys it needs. This approach may result in vehicles being over-
whelmed with many copies of messages containing commitment keys 
that they already possess. It. 
is computationally expensive to verify the broadcast messages and 
the scheme is vulnerable to denial of service attacks. 
5.5. Comparison and critical analysis 
In this sub-section, a comparative analysis of the three candidate 
solutions-symmetric, asymmetric VPKI and hash chain is presented, 
based on some fundamental security and performance properties that 
are essential to V2V broadcast communication. Table 3 indicates how 
each of the candidate solution meet or did not meet the corresponding 
security and performance properties. The information in there can be 
used to assess which of these alternatives might be most appropriate to 
provide robust security solution for which safety application. On one 
hand, V2V communications should be reliable, secure and provide real- 
time performance. On the other end, the extra processing and message 
overheads required for a given security solution should not affect the 
quality of V2V services. The main idea is therefore to look for an optimal 
solution that can satisfy the key security properties of V2V broadcast 
communication with minimal impact to the performance requirements 
of the underlying safety applications. It should be noted that the figures 
provided in this table are from a pure software implementation of the 
crypto algorithms. 
Asymmetric PKI-based schemes provides the needed security level, 
and satisfy majority of the security properties required by V2V broadcast 
communication. Moreover, these schemes were recommended to secure 
V2X communications by the security working groups of some stan-
dardization bodies e.g. ETSI C2X Communication Consortium (C2X CC). 
But still there is lack of experimental deployment and performance 
evaluation of these schemes under realistic traffic conditions for 
different safety applications. Indeed, the effectiveness of this approach 
depends on what type of safety messages is protecting and the charac-
teristics of those messages. For safety applications that generate event- 
driven messages, which do not occur frequently, the asymmetric VPKI- 
based security solution can be conveniently applied to protect them. 
On the other hand, for safety applications that generate periodic 
broadcast messages, the high computation experienced while perform-
ing asymmetric operations to verify each received message at the 
receiving vehicle results in high delay that may exceed the maximum 
Fig. 6. TESLA’s operation.  
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tolerable latency for these safety-critical applications. Particularly in 
high vehicle density area, where vehicles exchange periodic safety 
messages with each other, verifying high number of received messages 
through signature scheme may lead to DoS attack. This makes 
asymmetric-based solutions not scalable to traffic density. Therefore, 
such an environment require faster security solutions that would not 
affect the performance of V2V safety applications. Moreover, asym-
metric VPKI approach were de-signed to provide security services at the 
application layer level of the communicating vehicles. The imple-
mentation of application layer security for. 
cellular-based V2V communications might require some system level 
modification from the mobile operator’s side. In addition, interfacing a 
VPKI system with cellular network elements would raise concerns about 
signaling cost implication, risk, management and maintenance is-sues, 
etc., which need to be properly investigated. 
With regards to symmetric-based security solutions, these ap-
proaches are mainly applicable to vehicle-infrastructure-vehicle mode 
of communication, not direct V2V. Message verification depends on 
sending authenticity information from an infrastructure. Although these 
solutions are extremely fast with low communication and computational 
overheads, but they do not provide the needed security requirement of 
proving that a message really originate from a given sender. In addition, 
they require an efficient key distribution mechanism that will securely 
guarantee the exchange of shared secret keys between the sender and 
receiver(s). Distributing secret keys in one-to- many communication 
environment with dynamically changing end-points like V2V, and no 
prior knowledge between senders and receivers, is a complex challenge. 
It is neither efficient nor realistic for vehicles that accidently meet on the 
road to inter-actively establish a shared secret key between themselves 
prior to broadcasting messages, for a communication that occur peri-
odically with very short connection time. As such, this security approach 
is not feasible in V2V broadcast environment. 
Security solutions based on hash chain techniques provides fast 
message verification at low computational cost, which makes them 
suitable to be applied to secure safety messages in V2V communications. 
Particularly for safety applications that generate regular and predictable 
packets, these solutions can be effective with appropriate key disclosure 
delay interval and time quantization mechanism between senders and 
receivers. How-ever, the use of hash functions alone with different 
delayed key techniques in these solutions cannot prove the authenticity 
of a message sender. Moreover, the delayed key feature require accurate 
estimation of message propagation times, in order to evaluate a realistic 
delayed key disclosure time interval. This might be a problem especially 
with high moving vehicles, where the propagation channel character-
istics changes rapidly. 
In summary, the cost of cryptographic operations is one of the factors 
that affect the performance of V2V safety applications. The latency re-
quirements of most V2V safety applications are very strict; there is no 
stand-alone cryptographic solution that can satisfy all the needed se-
curity properties while meeting these latency constraints, particularly in 
high traffic density areas. Therefore, a hybrid-based approach that com- 
bines hash chain technique with digital signature can be applied at the 
3GPP access layer to provide fast message verification with non- 
repudiation property in order to satisfy the security and performance 
requirements of V2V broadcast communications. Below is a non- 
exhaustive list of salient features of 5G-based secure broadcast V2V 
communication as well as some lessons learnt in this study:  
• V2X communications can be used to improve road safety, enhance 
traffic efficiency and provide advanced in-vehicle user infotainment 
services  
• The V2V/P/I use cases have particular characteristics that constrain 
solutions: (1) high mobility of vehicles with short connection time 
(2) vehicles need to verify and process received broadcast messages 
rapidly (3) heterogeneous environment with varying density of ve-
hicles and (4) one-way transmission mode with no prior security 
association 
• The spread of malicious information in vehicular net-work environ-
ments could have disastrous consequences, including loss of life and 
property, thus V2V broadcast messages need to be protected against 
security threats, which include message forgery, replay, etc.  
• Although 3GPP presently concedes security to the upper layers of the 
ITS stack (i.e. application layer), however application layer tech-
niques incur higher latency, computational intensive and adds 
considerable overheads. Thus having a security solution at the access 
layer is conceivably preferable in order to ensure system compati-
bility and reduce deployment cost.  
• The security mechanisms employed in V2V must not pre-vent CAMs 
and DENMs safety messages being exchanged and processed by 
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legitimate V-UEs within the performance requirements of the un-
derlying safety applications.  
• The cost of cryptographic operations is one of the factors that affect 
the performance of V2V safety applications. Therefore a hybrid- 
based approach that combines hash chain technique with digital 
signature can be applied at the 3GPP access layer to provide fast 
message verification with non-repudiation property in order to 
satisfy the security and performance requirements of V2V broadcast 
communications. 
6. Challenges and further work 
This section presents the relevant open issues and challenges on 
providing 3GPP layer security solution for direct 5G-V2V communica-
tion over PC5 interface. 
6.1. Ubiquitous security solutions 
3GPP also defines autonomous operation (also referred to as Mode 4) 
for the PC5-based V2V communication. In here, vehicles in close prox-
imity self-assign radio resources from a pre-defined resource pool, use 
other source of time synchronization, and independently scheduled 
communication between themselves without any network assistance. In 
the near future, this mode of operation will attract much interest in 
order to realize the full benefits of intelligent transport systems. More-
over, in situations where there is no network availability e.g. high-way 
or rural roads, vehicles shall solely rely on the direct PC5 link for both 
data exchange and control signaling. To this end, there is need to extend 
the security solution to cater for such a distributed and independent 
setup. 
6.2. Support for multi-hop broadcast network 
Some safety applications require multi-hop transmission of the safety 
messages in order to extend message reachability to vehicles that are few 
meters away from the incidence area. In multi-hop broadcast trans-
mission, some vehicles acts as relay nodes by re-broadcasting the safety 
messages to their neighbors. Each forwarded broadcast packet should be 
verified at every hop before re-transmission. It is important for any se-
curity solution that is envisioned for cellular-V2X system to sup-port 
multi-hop communication so that only verified messages are forwarded. 
6.3. Implementing vehicular VPKI in 5G cellular network 
How a VPKI architecture is implemented can vary from one system to 
another. As such, the introduction of VPKI system in existing 3GPP ar-
chitecture is another research area that need to be investigated. The 
VPKI system will require to be inter-faced with core network nodes to 
receive requests, distribute certificates, collect misbehaviour reports, 
and revoke certificates. This will increase the signaling cost within the 
mobile network side. Therefore, the complexity and cost of having a 
VPKI system into a 3GPP architecture need to be properly understood. 
Also, support for roaming among vehicles 
that belongs to different operators is an issue. In roaming situations, 
vehicles needs to obtain certificates from their respective home network 
V2X Control Function (VCF) and at the same time, use the certificates to 
verify messages exchanged between them-selves. How different VCFs for 
different operators coordinate certificate distribution and management 
is a challenge. There is need for the security scheme to offer a universal 
method that can support V2V secure communications, even during 
roaming and across multiple operators. 
7. Conclusion 
V2V safety applications aims to improve road safety and traffic ef-
ficiency by sending advanced warning messages to drivers to support 
their decisions, through the cooperative exchange of messages between 
connected vehicles. Since these safety messages are broadcasted in open 
access environment, it is there-fore important to ensure that safety 
messages indeed originate from a legitimate vehicle, and that the 
received message content can be verified in a timely manner by the 
receiving vehicles without impacting the critical latency of safety ap-
plications. The approach to provide these security goals for V2V safety 
applications is predominantly based on cryptographic methods. How-
ever, the unique characteristics of V2V broadcast communication as well 
as the performance requirements of the safety applications imposes a 
great challenge to implement a security solution. 
In this paper, after reviewing the benefits of using cellular-based 
radio technologies to provide communication platform for vehicles to 
exchange safety messages, different V2V applications, use-cases and 
their corresponding performance requirements were presented. Moving 
on to the main aim of this study, which is investigating the security 
aspect of 5G-based V2V broadcast communication in cellular network, 
various security issues were identified and a survey of different cryp-
tographic methods used to build defence mechanism and largely satisfy 
the required security properties in V2V communication was provided 
from the literature. The access layer cryptographic options are asym-
metric VPKI, symmetric and hash chains. Each of these options have 
their own benefits and weaknesses, particularly when applied to V2V 
broadcast domain. When compared, a few points can be highlighted: 
symmetric-based solutions are faster than asymmetric VPKI- based so-
lutions. However, security can be better achieved by digital signatures 
that provide non-repudiation and immediate authentication benefits. On 
the other hand, for V2V safety applications that periodically generate 
broadcast messages, asymmetric VPKI-based security solutions cannot 
efficiently handle these kind of messages especially in denser traffic 
environment since they have longer message verification time compared 
to other methods. Therefore, a hybrid composition of hash chains with 
intermittent digital signatures is more appropriate for these type of 
safety applications. 
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